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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will explore the possibility of using tort law based
instruments for the enforcement of environmental standards. Not
by using these instruments vis-A-vis those who are violating envi-
ronmental standards (which could be regarded as a rather innova-
tive approach to the subject), but vis-&-vis public authorities not
taking sufficient enforcement action with respect to persons and
undertakings who are primarily responsible for the environmental
harm. Our main question therefore is, whether a non- or unsatis-
factory enforcement of environmental law by public authorities
can result in liability to pay damages based on general civil law.
The approach that will be introduced is one of the "hottest" and
most discussed subjects in legal practice and academia alike, in
the Netherlands today.
In the past, the Netherlands was not known for its enforce-
ment of environmental law. Some years ago there was a rather
high rate of non-enforcement. However, the occurrence of several
accidents in the Netherlands and Europe has changed ideas on
the importance of environmental law enforcement. This change of
mind was triggered by a fireworks explosion, a caf6 fire, a sinking
ship on the river Rhine, an explosion of a Turkish slum, and a
German bank that went bankrupt. In all of these accidents the
injured parties raised the issue of whether the public enforcement
authorities were liable to pay damages. The question raised by
the injured parties will be the focal point of this paper.
* Kars de Graaf is a lecturer in the Department for Administrative Law and
Public Administration of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Jan Jans is
professor of Administrative Law and the head of the Department for Administrative
Law and Public Administration of the University of Groningen. The authors would
like to thank Linda Boer for her excellent research for this paper.
377
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Illustrative of the public authorities' failure to adequately en-
force Dutch environmental law is the S.E. Fireworks accident that
occured in the Netherlands. The incident involved explosions that
occurred on the premises S.E. Fireworks, a company which stored
and assembled fireworks in the City of Enschede in the eastern
part of the Netherlands. On Saturday, May 13, 2000, a series of
explosions occurred at the S.E. Fireworks facility causing the
death of twenty-two persons and injuring almost one thousand
more. The incident inflicted extensive damage on a large area im-
mediately surrounding the factory, including a residential area.
Questions were raised as to whether the operator was abiding by
the terms of his license and whether enforcement procedures were
being fully implemented. It was argued that the stored fireworks
were heavier than permitted and that were stored in an unsafe
manner: the containers were both too heavy and not fire-resistant
enough. It was also argued that the State and the City of En-
schede did not fulfill their compliance and enforcement responsi-
bilities with respect to the S.E. Fireworks facility and its operator.
This raises the question of whether this omission on the part of
the State or City public authorities, or both, should cause them to
be liable for damages.
At least in the Netherlands, the S.E. Fireworks accident was
the starting point for a renewed interest in the liability of public
authorities for non-enforcement. This paper will introduce the
reader to the debate. The following questions are vital to the sub-
ject: (1) Is there a legal duty for public authorities to enforce envi-
ronmental law?; (2) Are public authorities liable to pay damages if
they fail to enforce environmental law?; and (3) What, if any, is
the influence of European law on this subject? The first question
will be answered in section two of this paper, and the second ques-
tion will be answered in section three. Sections two and three will
discuss the influence of European law. Section four will have
some concluding remarks.
II. AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OBLIGATION TO
ENFORCE?
A. Dutch Administrative Law
As in most legal systems, in the Netherlands, the protection of
the environment is in the hands of state authorities. Public bodies
in the Netherlands are entitled to grant licenses to companies
such as S.E. Fireworks. The terms of these licenses are designed
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to protect the environment by prescribing, among other things,
the best available control techniques. In most cases, the public
authorities are also entitled to supervise and enforce the environ-
mental standards as defined by the terms of the licenses. The ex-
ecutives of public authorities supervise companies' adherence to
the terms of the licenses by checking, for instance, the safety of
public buildings and the installations of industrial plants. The
principal instruments employed for enforcement of environmental
standards are bestuursdwang (a compulsory order allowing public
authorities to repair damage at the infringer's expense) and last
onder dwangsom (an enforcement order subject to a penalty for
non-compliance). Both sanctions are designed to end any non-
compliance and bring the targeted facility into compliance with
legal requirements. Only parties that have a direct interest in the
matter may request enforcement by the public authority. Thus,
the main question that must be answered is whether national ad-
ministrative or European law requires the public authority to en-
force environmental law if it is made aware of instances of non-
compliance.
In general, Dutch statutory law does not acknowledge an en-
forcement obligation. Dutch statutory law merely states that pub-
lic authorities are entitled to enforce on a discretionary basis.
Thus, there is no express general statutory rule mandating that a
public authority must enforce the law in general, and environmen-
tal law in particular. This lack of express statutory mandate
could lead to the conclusion that Dutch law imposes no duty upon
public authorities to enforce environmental law. However, there
is more.
Environmental law and, more specifically, Article 18.2 of the
Environment Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer) provides that
the administrative authority entitled to grant permits has a duty
of care to enforce the legal rules with respect to the buildings and
the activities conducted within it." A close reading of this provi-
sion clarifies that although it codifies a duty to enforce, it is not an
absolute duty.2 The case law of the Administrative Jurisdiction
Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van
de Raad van State), the highest administrative court in the
Netherlands for environmental disputes, consistently states the
1. See Wet Milieubeheer [Environmental Management Act] § 18.2 (2004)
(Neth.), available at http://www.eel.nl/documents/EnvironmentalManagementAct
May2004.pdf.
2. See id.
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following: "In cases of non-compliance, authorities are in principle
required to enforce the environmental standards. Only in ex-
traordinary circumstances it can refrain from taking the appropri-
ate measures."
3
Although great emphasis lies in enforcing environmental law,
it seems that enforcement is not a strict legal obligation because
circumstances exist in which it is possible to refrain from taking
enforcement measures. For instance, a public authority, con-
fronted with non-compliance of environmental standards, must
only enforce those standards absent extraordinary circumstances.
Non-enforcement is acceptable to the Administrative Jurisdiction
Division when the possibility exist to legalize the infringement (by
granting a license) or when the discretionary power to enforce is
exercised so unreasonably that no reasonable public authority
could ever have come to it. Those familiar with English law will
have no difficulty seeing the resemblance of Wednesbury (unrea-
sonableness). 4 In this way the court does not decide what the rea-
sonable authority would do, but only what no reasonable
authority could do. 5
A somewhat different situation arises when no infringement
of environmental law has been found yet. The decision of a public
authority to supervise the safety of establishments and companies
has an important political dimension that involves prioritizing
and costs. Public authorities do not have unlimited amounts of
money to spend on supervision. Therefore, one can argue that this
is a policy decision with large discretion available to the public
authority concerned.
B. European Influences
1. European Community Law
An important question is whether European Community Law
forces Member States to enforce environmental standards. Most
of the national water and air quality standards, emission-stan-
3. See, e.g., Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) 11 August 2004, UJN: AQ6637. Cf A.B.
Blomberg & F.C.M.A. Michiels, Between Enforcement and Toleration of Breaches of
Environmental Law - Dutch Policy Explained, in: 4 THE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAw 181-208 (T.F.M. Etty & H. Somsen, eds., Oxford University Press
2005).
4. See Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948) 1 K.B. 223,
229 ("[Tlhere may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream
that it lay within the powers of the authority.").
5. See id. at 234.
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dards for discharges in water and air, waste legislation, and regu-
lation of nuclear energy, nature conservation, pesticides and
biocides all have, at least in part, a European directive or regula-
tion as their origin. European law is of great importance for
Dutch environmenta ' law because European directives require
transposition into Dutch law.
The mere transposition of environmental directives into na-
tional law is, of course, not enough. The obligations they contain
first have to be applied and then enforced. This is primarily a re-
sponsibility of the Member States. Article 175(4) of the European
Community Treaty ("EC Treaty") states, in so many words, that
the Member States shall implement the environmental policy. 6
The Court has held, in connection with Article 10 of the EC
Treaty, that to the extent that environmental directives and regu-
lations do not provide for specific enforcement obligations, na-
tional enforcement measures must be effective, proportionate, and
dissuasive. 7 Furthermore, national rules dealing with infringe-
ments of Community environmental standards should not be less
favorable than those governing infringements of national environ-
mental law. The Eurpean Commission supervises the manner in
which Community environmental law is enforced. Although the
European Commission does not have any formal competence to
ensure compliance with European environmental legislation in
the territory of the Member States, inadequate enforcement may
be a reason for the Commission to initiate proceedings for in-
fringement of the Treaty.
Environmental directives sometimes contain provisions which
require a certain type of enforcement by the Member States. Arti-
cle 5(4) of Directive 76/4648 provides an example of such enforce-
ment. This directive compels national authorities to establish
emission standards in permits to prevent water pollution. The
provision states:
Should the emission standards not be complied with, the com-
petent authority in the Member States concerned shall take all
6. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340).
7. See Case C-186/98, Ministerio Publico v. Nunes, 1999 E.C.R. 1-4883, 6.
8. Council Directive 76/464, ON POLLUTION CAUSED BY CERTAIN DANGEROUS SUB-
STANCES DISCHARGED INTO THE AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMUNITY, art. 5(4),
1976 O.J. (L 129) 23 (EC).
2007] 381
5
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
appropriate steps to ensure that the conditions of authorisation
are fulfilled and, if necessary, that the discharge is prohibited.9
This provision implies, in our view, that it is not permitted to
tolerate discharges which violate the Community emission stan-
dards of Directive 76/464.
Other environmental directives similarly contain enforcement
provisions. A more recent example is the Seveso II Directive (96/
82).1o The Seveso disaster was an industrial accident that oc-
curred in 1976 in a small chemical manufacturing plant in Italy.
It resulted in the highest known exposure of 2,3,7,8-te-
trachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) in residential populations
which gave rise to the European Union industrial safety regula-
tions, known as the Seveso directives. The second Seveso Direc-
tive was proposed because of severe accidents, amongst which was
the aformentioned accident in Enschede. One of the objectives of
the Seveso II Directive is to ensure increased consistency in en-
forcement at the European level through greater prescriptive de-
tail of the obligations of the competent authorities. The most
important new element of the directive is Article 18(2). It states
that the competent authorities are required to organize an inspec-
tion system which can either consist of a systematic appraisal of
each establishment or of at least one on-site inspection per year.11
This European obligation has had its effect on Dutch legislation.
Although the scope of the Seveso II Directive is limited to certain
and not all industrial installations, it implies a legal obligation for
public authorities to supervise a "Seveso-installation" at least
once a year.
In most directives however, the requirement to enforce Euro-
pean law is stated in fairly general terms in the sense that Mem-
ber States must take all appropriate legal or administrative action
in case of infringement of the provisions of the directive or regula-
tion. In the absence of concrete and specific provisions, Member
States must first determine how the factual situation has to be
brought in line with the legally desired situation.
According to case law from the European Court of Justice, di-
rectives have to be implemented not only in fact, but also in law.
Thus, even where a directive is adequately transposed into na-
tional law, but the national provisions are not effectively enforced,
9. Id.
10. See Council Directive 96/82, ON THE CONTROL OF MAJOR-ACCIDENT HAZARDS
INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, ART. 18, 1996 O.J. (L 10) 13, (EU).
11. Id. art. 18.2.
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this will not suffice. The first time this was confirmed for environ-
mental directives was in case C-42/89, in which the Court held
that Belgium had failed to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty
because the supply of drinking water to the city of Verviers did not
in fact meet the required standards.12
A second example of a Court of Justice decision in which a
Member State was held to have failed to implement a directive in
fact is the Blackpool case.13 In this case, the United Kingdom
("UK") was held to have failed to take all the necessary measures
to ensure that the quality of bathing water in the bathing areas in
Blackpool and adjacent to Formby and Southport conformed to the
value limits set in accordance with Directive 76/160 on bathing
water. 14 The main argument of the UK Government was that it
had taken "all practicable steps" to meet the value limits. 15 The
Court rejected this argument, observing that it was clear from Ar-
ticle 4(1) of the directive that the Member States are to take all
necessary measures to ensure that, within ten years following the
notification of the directive, bathing water conforms to the value
limits set in accordance with Article 3 of the directive. 16 It added
that this period is longer than that laid down for the implementa-
tion of the directive, namely two years from the date of notifica-
tion (Article 12(1)), in order to enable the Member States to
comply with this requirement. 17 The only derogations from the
obligation contained in Article 4(1) are those provided for in Arti-
cles 4(3), 5(2) and 8.18 The Court reached the following
conclusion:
It follows that the directive requires the Member States to
take steps to ensure that certain results are attained, and, apart
from those derogations, they cannot rely on particular circum-
stances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation.
Consequently, the United Kingdom's argument that it took all
practicable steps cannot afford a further ground, in addition to the
derogations expressly permitted, justifying the failure to fulfil the
12. Case C-42/89, Comm'n v. Kingdom of Belgium, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2821.
13. Case C-5/90, Comm'n v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nothern Ire-
land, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4109.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id. at 42.
18. Id. at 43.
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obligation to bring the waters at issue into conformity at least
with the annex to the directive. 19
The operative part of the judgment makes quite clear that
there is nothing for it to do but to ensure that the bathing water
conforms to the value limits set in the directive. 20 The Court de-
clared that:
by failing to take all the necessary measures to ensure that
the quality of the bathing water in Blackpool and of those adjacent
to Southport conforms to the limit values set in accordance with
Article 3 of Council Directive 76/160/EEC ... the United Kingdom
has failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC Treaty.21
Another important case in this respect, again involving the
UK, is case C-340/96. This case concerned the system of accept-
ance by the Secretary of State for the Environment of so called
"undertakings" under Sections 18 through 24 of the Water Indus-
try Act 1991.22 Section 18 of the Act provides that, where a water
company supplies water that does not comply with the purity re-
quirements, the Secretary of State must in principle make an en-
forcement order.23 Under Section 19(1) of the Act, the Secretary of
State is not required to make an enforcement order in relation to
any company if he is, inter alia, satisfied that the company in
question has given an undertaking to take all such steps as it ap-
pears to him for the time being to be appropriate for the company
to take for the purpose of securing or facilitating compliance with
the relevant rules.24 The Court ruled that Member States must,
in order to secure the full implementation of directives in law and
not only in fact, establish a specific legal framework in the area in
question.25 In the case of the mechanism of undertakings which
was at issue in these proceedings, the Court held that this had not
been achieved. 26
[The Act] authorises the Secretary of State to accept an un-
dertaking on the sole condition that it contains such measures as
it appears to him for the time being to be appropriate for the com-
pany to take in order to secure or facilitate compliance with the
19. Id. at 43-44.
20. Id. at 47.
21. Id. at Operative part, 1.
22. Case C-340/96, Comm'n v. United Kingdom of great Britain an Northern Ire-
land, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2023.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
384 [Vol. 24
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standards in question. The Act thus does not specify the matters
to be covered by the undertakings, in particular the parameters to
be observed in respect of derogations, the programme of work to be
carried out and the time within which it must be completed, and,
where appropriate, the information to be given to the population
groups concerned. 27
This judgment makes it clear that a statutory system which
allows the government to tolerate the infringements of a directive
is incompatible with Community law and it underlines the fact
that failure to properly transpose a directive into national law as
well as a factual infringement of Community standards may cause
the Court to hold that a Member State has failed to fulfill its
obligations. 28
Finally, according to the judgment of the European Court of
Justice in case C-494/01 (Commission v. Ireland) on twelve spe-
cific factual infringements of the Framework Waste Directive the
Court ruled that:
[Iun principle nothing prevents the Commission from seeking
in parallel a finding that provisions of a directive have not been
complied with by reason of the conduct of a Member State's au-
thorities with regard to particular specifically identified situations
and a finding that those provisions have not been complied with
because its authorities have adopted a general practice contrary
thereto, which the particular situations illustrate where
appropriate. 29
In other words, the Commission is entitled to deduce from a
series of individual infringements that there is a "general prac-
tice" of non-compliance and non-enforcement. This implies that
the Commission is not only entitled to demand that these individ-
ual infringements of the Directive are remedied, but also that the
public authorities in question change, more fundamentally and
structurally, their enforcement policies.30
2. The European Convention on Human Rights
Besides the influence of the law of the European Community
on the legal obligation to enforce environmental law, the decision
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id.
29. Case C-494101, Comm'n v. Ireland, 2005 E.C.R. 1-33331.
30. Cf P. Wenneras, EC Environmental Law in National and Community Courts
(2006) (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
(Peter Wenneras) at 205-212.
2007] 385
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in the Oneryildiz case by the European Court of Human Rights
has had considerable influence on the debate in the
Netherlands. 31
Oneryildiz, a Turkish national, and the twelve members of his
family, were living in the shantytown of Hekimbasi Vmraniye
near Istanbul.32 This town was nothing more than a collection of
slums built on land surrounding a rubbish tip which had been
used jointly by four district councils since the 1970s and was
under the authority and responsibility of the main City Council of
Istanbul.33 An expert report prepared on May 7, 1991, at the re-
quest of the Pskiidar District Court, drew the authorities' atten-
tion to the fact that no measure had been taken to prevent a
possible explosion of the methane gas being emitting from the de-
composing refuse.34 On April 28, 1993 a methane-gas explosion
occurred at the waste-collection site and the refuse erupting from
the pile of waste buried eleven houses situated below it, including
the one belonging to Oneryildiz.35 Oneryildiz lost nine members of
his family in the explosion. 36
Following criminal and administrative investigations of the
explosion, the mayors of tmraniye and Istanbul were brought
before the courts.3 7 On April 4, 1996 the mayors were both con-
victed of "negligence in the exercise of their duties" and sentenced
to a fine of 160,000 Turkish liras ("TRL") and the minimum three-
month prison sentence provided for in Article 230 of the Criminal
Code, which was, moreover, commuted to a fine.38 The court or-
dered a stay of execution of those fines. 39
Subsequently, on his own behalf and on the behalf of his three
surviving children, 0neryildiz filed an action for damages in the
Istanbul Administrative Court against the authorities which he
deemed liable for the death of his relatives and the destruction of
his property. 40 He complained under Article 2 (right to life) of the
ECHR that the accident had occurred as a result of negligence on
31. Oneryildiz v. Turkey, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (2004).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
[Vol. 24386
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the part of the relevant authorities. 41 He also complained of the
deficiencies in the administrative and criminal proceedings insti-
tuted under Article 6, section 1 (right to a fair hearing within a
reasonable time) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).42
In a judgment dated November 30, 1995, the authorities were or-
dered to pay the Oneryildiz and his children TRL 100,000,000 in
non-pecuniary damages and TRL 10,000,000 in pecuniary dam-
ages (at the time, the equivalent of approximately 2,077 and 208
euros respectively), the latter amount being limited to the destruc-
tion of household goods. 43
Regarding the implementation of preventive measures for the
rubbish tip, the Court noted that relevant protective regulations
did exist.44 The expert report showed that the rubbish tip did not
comply with certain technical standards and the local and minis-
terial authorities had failed to take the measures required by the
relevant regulations to ensure those standards were met.45 Al-
though some decontamination work had been commenced in 1989,
the Court noted that it had been stopped by court order, i.e., a
State organ whose decision had prolonged the deplorable situation
with regard to the rubbish tip.46 The Court considered that the
expert report of 1991 had merely highlighted a situation of which
the municipal authorities were supposed to have knowledge and
be in control, especially as there were specific regulations that had
not been complied with.47 The Court found that although the na-
tional authorities had not encouraged the applicant to set up
home near the rubbish tip, they had not dissuaded him from doing
so either.48 The Court noted the extent of the authorities' negli-
gence and found that Oneryildiz established a causal link between
their negligence and the accident. 49 Accordingly, the Court held
that the administrative authorities had known or should have
known that the inhabitants of certain slum areas had been faced
with a real threat, the authorities had failed to remedy the situa-
tion, and they had not done all that could reasonably have been
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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expected of them to avoid the risks in question. 50 Moreover, the
authorities had failed in their duty to inform the inhabitants of
the area of those risks.51
The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 2
because of unsatisfactory enforcement measures, unless the appli-
cant's complaints could be deemed to have been remedied in the
domestic proceedings by the effective implementation of the ap-
propriate judicial machinery.5 2 The Court found that the criminal
proceedings, as conducted (the subject of the trial had been lim-
ited to "negligence;" the negligible amount of the fines), could not
be considered to have been an adequate and effective remedy.
53
The same was true of the administrative proceedings: Oneryildiz's
right to compensation had not been acknowledged until four
years, eleven months and ten days after his first claims for com-
pensation had been dismissed and the EUR 2,077 compensation -
a questionable amount itself - awarded to him had not yet been
paid. 54
III. PRIVATE LIABILITY FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT?
A. Dutch Liability Law
The main tool to asses the conduct of public authorities is the
general tort law provision in Dutch law, Article 162 of Book 6 of
the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek). According to this provision,
only the infringement of a right, a breach of a statutory duty, or a
breach of a duty that follows from unwritten law can result in lia-
bility. These three grounds are equally applicable for public and
private bodies and for every person. The last two grounds are of
special interest to answer the central question in this paper.
The question as to whether a statutory duty exists is one we
tried to answer in the foregoing paragraph about the administra-
tive law requirement to enforce environmental law. If such a duty
for a public authority existed, non-enforcement could amount to a
wrongful act and could therefore cause liability. In specific cases,
a statutory duty to supervise and enforce environmental law ex-
ists in the Netherlands. Although the transposition of the afore-
mentioned Seveso II Directive, in fact, will imply in some cases a
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at n. 9.
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statutory duty to supervise (and perhaps to enforce) and the influ-
ence of European Community law is pointing in the same direc-
tion, until now these arguments have never led to the liability of a
public authority for breach of a statutory duty to enforce.
The "absence" of a statutory duty to enforce puts even more
emphasis on the possibility that a duty that follows from unwrit-
ten law, a duty to take "due care," could lead to private law liabil-
ity. In the case where public authorities know about the non-
compliance and the risk involved, the question about the liability
is reasonably easy. In those circumstances, one could easily con-
clude that there was a failure to take due care. Did not the legis-
lature state that the local authority was entitled to enforce the
safety rules? Could not the inhabitants in the vicinity of S.E. Fire-
works in Enschede assume that the public authority would have
taken the necessary measures vis-A-vis the owner of the company
to comply? The answer to these questions could easily be affirma-
tive. A more difficult situation is the one in which the public au-
thority does not know about the non-compliance, but could have
had an unwritten duty to find out about it and is, by not doing so,
negligent. In these cases the Dutch judiciary applies the criteria
that were set forth by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands
(Hoge Raad) in the famous Basement Hatch case about an opened
basement hatch and the duty to warn about the dangers. These
general criteria state that: (1) the greater the severity and the
scale of the possible damages (mainly bodily injury); (2) the
greater the chance that the damage could occur; and (3) the graver
the danger, the greater the duty to take care. Finally, the Court
states that the less difficult (time, costs, and trouble) it is to take
precautionary measures (isolated as well as in relation to the pos-
sible damage), the more one is required to take such measures.
These criteria have not been developed in cases of liability for non-
enforcement but should be regarded as the Dutch guidelines for
answering the question of liability in cases where the non-enforce-
ment was caused by omission and lack of knowledge of the non-
compliance.
In applying these guidelines, one should always take into ac-
count that the legislature has assigned the duty to enforce to the
competent public authority and that in doing so it influenced the
duty to take care. The same can be said for the administrative
case law according to which the competent public authority in
principle has the obligation to enforce environmental law. In
Dutch literature the main argument in favor of liability is the
20071 389
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trust that the general public is entitled to have.55 The public at
large must be able to trust that public authorities do supervise
and enforce the law. On the other hand, it has been argued that
the root of the problem does not lie with the public authority, but
with the company that did not comply with environmental stan-
dards. That the government operates solely in the interest of the
public, and not in the interest of individuals, thus the possibility
of liability will lead to a flood of claims. One has to consider that
these arguments may have a role in determining whether there
was a failure of the duty to take due care.
In most cases a statutory duty will be absent and it will diffi-
cult to prove the failure of a duty to take due care. Still, there
seems to be the possibility of holding public authorities liable for
non-enforcement of environmental law. Dutch law recognizes a
set of requirements to do so. Besides the question of attribution of
the wrongful act or wrongful omission to the public authority,
which will not be a major problem in cases of non-enforcement,
there are two well discussed requirements.
1. Causation?
A much discussed subject in tort law is causation. For a pub-
lic authority to be held liable, it must be shown that the particular
acts or omissions were the cause of the loss or the damage sus-
tained. This element of causation, with respect to this paper,
must be addressed because the primary cause for the loss or dam-
age of non-compliance is not the conduct of the public authority,
but the violation of environmental law by a third party. The
courts in the Netherlands, however, have not given any reason to
believe that this would be a sound argument to refuse a claim
against a non-enforcing public authority. In fact, most lawyers ac-
cept the possibility of multiple causes, especially in cases of non-
enforcement. Both third parties and the public authority can be
held liable. Dutch law does state, however, that if a wrongful act
or omission gives rise to a risk and the risk has subsequently been
realized, it is not up to the plaintiff to prove the causal relation
between the conduct of the public authority and the loss or dam-
55. C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheid van de overheid wegens onvoldoende
toezicht en handhaving, in: A.J. Akkermans & E.H.P. Brans (red.), Aansprakelijkheid
en schadeverhaal bij rampen, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2002, p. 112-113; Cf. also:
A.A. van Rossum, Civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid voor overheidstoezicht (oriation
Utrecht), Deventer: Kluwer 2005 and I. Giesen, Toezicht en aansprakelijkheid,
Deventer: Kluwer 2005.
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age as would normally be the case. Rather, the defendant must
prove that the loss or damage would have also occurred without
his conduct.
The question of whether the required causal relation is in fact
a considerable obstacle for any claim against a public authority for
non-enforcement has to be answered in the negative.
2. Is the Plaintiff's Interest Protected by the Law?
An important limitation on the liability of public authorities
for non-enforcement is the condition that the plaintiffs interest
must be protected by the law per Article 163 of Book 6 of the
Dutch Civil Code. More specifically, a court must determine
whether the conduct of the public authority violated a rule that
protects the plaintiffs interest. This condition plays an important
role in Dutch tort law and is bipartite. The legislature explained
that the objective of Article 163 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code
is to decline liability if: (a) the norm breached (written or unwrit-
ten) does not protect the interest of the plaintiff, and if (b) the type
of damage (personal injury or financial damages) must fall within
the scope of protection the norm offers. Recent Dutch case law of
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has demonstrated that this
limitation seems to effectively block any claim against public au-
thorities for non-enforcement of environmental law.
The case most discussed in the Netherlands regarding non-
compliance is the Vessel Linda case. In the case, no person was
injured, but the damage was substantial. The second-hand, old,
and rusty vessel "Linda" was subject to supervision according to a
Dutch law that governs the river-worthiness of vessels on the
river Rhine. After inspection by the competent public authority,
the vessel was granted a certificate to make use of the river Rhine
for another seven years. Under normal circumstances the public
authority would have granted this certificate for another five
years, but in this case, the public authority apparently was con-
vinced that it was alright to grant the certificate for the seven
years rather than five. Several months later, in April 1992, the
vessel was being loaded with sand. During the night of April 22,
1992, the "Linda" sunk due to it being poorly maintained and cor-
roded. "Linda" was alongside a floating dredge-combination called
the "Annette," which sunk with her. It was clear that the "Linda"
caused the accident and the damage to the "Annette." Dutch
courts ruled that the public authority which inspected the "Linda"
had not done so in a careful manner. Nonetheless, the main ques-
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tion that still needed to be answered was whether the damage
sustained by the plaintiff, the owner of the "Annette," was indeed
protected by law. In other words, did the law protect the plaintiffs
interest against the particular hazard encountered? The Supreme
Court in the Netherlands ruled that this was not the case. It said
that the law was written for the general interest and was con-
cerned with the safety of vessels on the Rhine, but was not written
to protect the plaintiff from the financial damages sustained. Al-
though one could interpret this ruling as dismissing all claims of
liability for non-enforcement, the exact scope of this verdict is still
rather unclear. An important question, for instance, is whether
the Supreme Court would have ruled otherwise if there would
have been personal injury involved.
This case demonstrates that if liability for non-enforcement is
possible at all, non-enforcement of environmental law is not the
most likely candidate, for it is primarily written in the general
interest.
B. European Influences
Major parts of environmental law in Europe have a European
Union ("EU") dimension. In other words, a failure to enforce na-
tional law will also imply a failure to enforce European law. This
triggers the question of whether a failure of public authorities to
enforce environmental legislation with an EU dimension can re-
sult in liability to pay damages as a matter of European law.
Early Dutch case law concerning a nuclear power station at
Borssele showed the possible use of EC law to substantiate a claim
for damages vis-h-vis state authorities. In this case The Hague
district court observed that the State would be acting unlawfully if
it allowed the radiation standards in the Euratom Directive to be
exceeded. Environmental organizations had argued that the State
was acting unlawfully by exceeding the maximum admissible
doses of radiation laid down in the Euratom directives. The court
ruled that the directives conferred direct rights on individuals
which they could rely on in proceedings against the state. How-
ever, the claim was dismissed because there was no evidence that
the standards had been exceeded.
In the early 1980s, the European Court of Justice ("EJC")
ruled in the notorious Francovich case 56 (not dealing with envi-
ronmental issues at all) "that it is a principle of Community law
56. Case C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
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that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage
caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which
they can be held responsible."57 In subsequent cases, 58 the Court
ruled that individuals who had suffered damage had a right to
reparation where three conditions were met: (1) the rule of law
infringed must have been intended to confer rights on individuals;
(2) the breach must be sufficiently serious; and (3) there must be a
direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on
the state and the damage sustained by the injured parties.59 In
particular, it is the first condition that will cause serious problems
in environmental cases.
Let us assume that there is a legal duty as a matter of Euro-
pean law for state authorities to take adequate enforcement mea-
sures and, that by not doing so, a public authority breaches
European law. If so, does rule or regulation that has been violated
- in this case, failing to take adequate enforcement measures -
aim at protecting individuals? The case law of the ECJ shows that
the most difficult cases that decided this issue were those where
the regulation: (a) aimed to protect the rights of individuals; and
(b) did not directly affect the rights of individuals, but only indi-
rectly, or in other words, through an obligation of the state.
The problems referred to under (a) above can be illustrated
with reference to the Court's judgment in the Peter Paul case.60
Peter Paul and others were customers of the BVH Bank.61 In
1987 the bank received authorization from the Bundesaufsicht-
samt (German supervisory authority) to engage in banking trans-
actions. 62  In the 1990s the bank suffered from financial
difficulties, prompting the Bundesaufsichtsamt to examine its af-
fairs. 63 In November 1997 the bank filed a bankruptcy petition
and the Bundesaufsichtsamt subsequently revoked the bank's au-
thorization. 64 Paul and others brought proceedings against the
Republic of Germany, seeking compensation for the loss of their
57. Id. at 37.
58. Case C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du P~cheur v. Germany & The Queen v.
Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame, Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029; Case C-178/
94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 & C-190/94, Dillenkofer et. al. v. Germany 1996
E.C.R. 1-04845.
59. See Brasserie du Pcheur at 51; see also Dillenkofer at 21.
60. Case C-222/02, Peter Paul and others v. Germany, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9425.
61. Id. at III 17.
62. Id.
63. Id. at III T 19.
64. Id. at III 20.
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deposits.65 The Court concluded that the applicable European
Banking directives could not be regarded as conferring on individ-
uals specific rights capable of giving rise to State liability on the
basis of Community law. 66 The Court looked for individual rights
in the directives but did not find them.67 That one of the objec-
tives of the directives was to protect depositors was insufficient to
create "rights for individuals." 68 Evidently, the Court required
that the particular Community rule that was violated must specif-
ically aim to protect the rights of individuals.
In many cases it is quite clear whether the directive in ques-
tion aims to create specific rights and obligations for individuals.
However, the situation is more complicated in regards to most of
the directives that are relevant in the field of environmental law.
Consider, for example, the obligations under the Environmental
Impact Assessment Directive.69 Under this directive, an environ-
mental impact assessment must be carried out before consent is
given for certain projects likely to have significant effects on the
environment. 70 From case law of the European Court of Justice, it
is clear that interested third parties may rely on these provisions
when before national courts. However, the directives do not give
third parties a right to have an environmental impact assessment
carried out as they are only affected indirectly by the obligations
of the State. Nevertheless, in Wells, the Court of Justice stated,
albeit in an obiter, that a Member State may be liable for a breach
of an obligation not to grant a consent before an environmental
impact assessment has been carried out.71 Apparently the Court
of Justice found that this provision intended to confer rights on
individuals.
Other national courts have also applied a similar, compara-
tively strict Schutznorm requirement. One example is the Dutch
Rechtbank Den Haag in the Shapiro case.72 Shapiro, a clinical
physicist, argued that the Netherlands should compensate him for
damage arising as a consequence of its unlawful action, princi-
65. Id. at III 22.
66. Id. at V 1 101.
67. Id. at V 94-100.
68. Id.
69. Council Directive 2003/35/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17-25.
70. Id.
71. Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec'y of State for Transp. Local Gov't and the Regions,
2004 E.C.R. 1-723, 66.
72. Shapiro, Rechtbank Den Haag [Hague District Court], Den Haag, 12 februrai
1996, RAwb 90 (ann. R. de L.) (Neth.).
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pally for loss of wages, because the Netherlands had for years
been in default in implementing Euratom directive. As a result,
demand for clinical physicists had been minimal and he had been
unable to find work in the Netherlands. His claim was dismissed,
the court holding that it was not the purpose of this directive to
create employment for physicists. The court held that the Nether-
lands had not acted unlawfully towards Shapiro.
In another case examining state liability to individuals, the
Dutch Gerechtshof Den Haag (The Hague appeals court), recently
issued a judgment concerning Article 5 in combination with Annex
III of the Nitrate Directive (91/676).73 Under this provision, Mem-
ber States must establish and implement action programmes to
reduce and prevent pollution caused by nitrates. The action
programmes must include measures which ensure that the
amount of livestock manure applied to the land each year does not
exceed 170 kg per hectare. In the view of the Gerechtshof, these
provisions were not intended to confer rights on individuals on the
basis of which individuals could hold the state liable for the cost of
purifying ground and surface water, or the cost of alternative
drinking water. It held that the directive did not lay down an obli-
gation by the state to guarantee a particular quality of water,
upon which individuals could then base quality entitlements as
against the state.
This latter judgment seems to be at odds with a decision of
the French Tribunal administratif (administrative court) at
Rennes.7 4 In 1995, the Tribunal d'instance (district court) at
Guincamp had ordered the Soci~td Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux to
pay compensation to 176 subscribers to its drinking water distri-
bution network on account of the excessive nitrate content of the
water it distributed. The Soci~t6 accordingly brought proceedings
before the Tribunal administratif to obtain compensation for the
state's late transposition of Article 5 of Directive 91/676. The Tri-
bunal accepted this argument and concluded that the state was
liable.
An English decision concerning several environmental direc-
tives also sheds light on this issue. In Bowden v. South West
Water and Another, a mussel fisherman claimed that he had been
73. The Netherlands/Waterpakt, Gerechtshof Den Haag [Hof] [Dutch Court of Ap-
peal], Den Haag, 27 oktober 2005, M&R 2006/1, nr. 4 (ann. J.J.) (Neth.).
74. Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, COM 2002
324 (June 28, 2002) (French Tribunal administratif Rennes, judgment given on
2.5.2001, Socit Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, req. No 97182).
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driven out of business because of water pollution in the fishing
waters which had been classified under a directive.7 5 The fisher-
man pleaded the breach of the Bathing Waters Directive (76/160),
the Shellfish Waters Directive (79/923) and the Urban Waste
Water Directive (91/271).76 The Court of Appeal applied the fol-
lowing test: "The question is whether the provision was adopted in
order to protect the interests of the person who claims to be enti-
tled to a right under the directive. ... ,,77 The High Court judge
who heard the case, whose conclusion was followed by the Court of
Appeal, noted that the plaintiffs claim was as a fisherman and
observed that neither the Bathing Waters Directive nor the Urban
Waste Water Directive was intended to confer rights on mussel
fisherman:
There is nothing in either which could possibly be said to en-
tail the grant of rights to shell-fisherman, or which would enable
the content of any such a right to be identified. They are con-
cerned with different subject matter. Of course, improvements in
water quality for bathers, and in treatment standards of waste
water, may assist other interest groups, but that is not enough to
give them a right of action.78
As regards the Shellfish Directives, the Court of Appeal
agreed with the High Court judge that they were at least related
to the plaintiffs activities, and that it could be said that if there
was a failure by the United Kingdom to implement or to comply
with the requirements of those directives it could have contributed
to the loss of the plaintiffs fishing grounds.7 9 However, if there
was a breach, it would be a breach of an obligation owed to the
public in general and there was nothing to tie such a breach to
specific rights of individuals or which would enable the content of
such a right to be ascertained.80 Accordingly, the court held that
there was no basis for a claim for damages.8 '
This judgment is particularly interesting because the court
adopted the position that where the rule applied as the basis of
the claim aims to protect "the public in general" it could not give
rise to an individual's successful claim for damages. If this posi-
75. Bowden v. South W. Water Services Ltd., 3 C.M.L.R. 330 (Q.B.D. 1998), affd 3
C.M.L.R. 180, 180 (C.A. 1999).
76. Bowden, 3 C.M.L.R. 180 at 180.
77. Bowden, 3 C.M.L.R. 180 at 184.
78. Bowden, 3 C.M.L.R. 330 at 345.
79. Bowden, 3 C.M.L.R. 180 at 185.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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tion were correct, it would mean that infringements by the state
of, for example, environmental (air and water) quality standards
could not give rise to liability to individuals. Even though the
standards are intended to protect the individual, individuals
would not be able to base a right to enforce them on the directives.
In our view, it is impossible to base such a strict interpretation on
the decisions of the Court of Justice with any certainty. We shall
therefore have to await further developments on this point.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In general, no one will dispute that environmental legislation
is intended to be enforced. In the Netherlands this intention is
recognized in the case law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Divi-
sion. Although no statute obligates public authorities to enforce
environmental law, the case law states that, if a public authority
is confronted with a situation of non-compliance and an absence of
extraordinary circumstances, the public authority should take
measures to force compliance. In this way, administrative law ac-
knowledges the duty to enforce. Some European directives more
or less state the obligation for Member States to enforce environ-
mental law. In absence of such explicit provisions, the intention of
enforcement is reinforced by the case law of the European Court of
Justice. The case law states that directives must be implemented
not only in fact, but also in law. In many cases the European
Court demands that Member States take all necessary measures
to ensure compliance with environmental standards. As a matter
of principle we can assume that public authorities are under a le-
gal duty to enforce environmental legislation. The main question
in this paper is whether public authorities are, by not enforcing,
liable to pay damages. The duty to enforce environmental law is
considered to be in the general interest and not aimed at protect-
ing the rights of individuals. This consideration seems to effec-
tively block any claim against public authorities for non-
enforcement.
A similar approach to the liability of public authorities can be
found in the English common law system.8 2 As is the case in the
Netherlands, the English courts exercise considerable restraint in
awarding judicial review remedies in respect of governmental pol-
icy decisions. One of the requirements for liability is that the de-
fendant ought to have foreseen that the plaintiff might suffer
82. Cf. PETER CANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 242 (3rd ed. 1996).
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injury or damage if the defendant acted negligently and that there
was a sufficient relationship of proximity between the plaintiff
and the defendant. The concept of proximity has been used as the
basis for refusing to impose a duty of care in several cases where it
was alleged that by negligence in exercising its functions, a law-
enforcement authority had failed to prevent the plaintiff from suf-
fering loss or damage as a result of conduct of a third party. The
authority's function, as was decided in Dutch case law, was to pro-
tect the public as a whole, not as specific individuals. In addition,
English tort law recognizes the need for compatibility with the
statutory scheme, which requires the courts to decide whether the
imposition of a duty of care would be consistent with the general
scheme and particular provisions of the relevant statute.8 3 In En-
glish law, the concept of proximity and the requirement compati-
bility with the statutory scheme do block effectively, as does the
idea in European and Dutch law that the duty to enforce environ-
mental law is not aimed at protecting the rights of individuals,
any liability of public authorities for non- or unsatisfactory en-
forcement of environmental law.
It is generally conceded that these concepts are simply a cover
for giving effect to value-judgments about the desirable scope of
liability. Because we feel there is no sound argument against con-
structing liability of public authorities for non- or unsatisfactory
enforcement of environmental law, there is an opportunity, and
perhaps a need, to reinterpret and redefine the scope of the duty
to enforce in a way that protects the rights and interests of
individuals.
83. See Yuen Kun Yeu v. AttorneyGeneral of Hong Kong, [1988] A.C. 175, 178-81
(P.C. 1987); Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [19891 A.C. 53, 55-62 (H.L.
1988); Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd.,
[1985] A.C. 210, 212-13 (H.L. 1984); Murphy v Brentwood D.C., [199111 A.C. 398, 403-
10 (H.L. 1990).
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